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
22 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Imagery Analysis Service

SUBJECT : DDI Attitudinal Survey

REFERENCE: Your memo of 7 April 1976

- l. Enclosed is the response to your request for MAG's interpretation of selected IAS "scores" in the recent attitudinal survey. It should be noted that the MAG considered perceptions of reality vital to the understanding of responses to certain questions. These perceptions were not necessarily based on fact.
- 2. The MAG met on 9, 13, and 20 April to respond to the Director's request and to decide on a number of unrelated procedural matters. A decision was made to rotate the position of group chairman quarterly, with the present term ending 30 June. Approval is officially requested to increase the membership of the group from 9 to 11. Both ERD and LFD need an additional representative to bring them up to strength within the group.



Chairman/ IAS Management Advisory Group

Enclosure: a/s

Distribution:

Original - Addressee, w/att

1 - IAS MAG Members, w/att

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- 1. (Item 6) The prevailing attitude is that a "numbers game" is followed by IAS management to the extent that careers can be significantly affected by the number of reports/memos published by an analyst. Furthermore, the existence of the Gold Star file is perceived as an example of the importance placed upon this "numbers game." The publication most frequently cited as having the least merit was the IAS PI Notes.
- 2. (Item 7) A perception was shared by some in IAS that the rest of the directorate and NPIC did not have to absorb the same percentage of cutbacks that IAS did. However, the predominant reason for concern was the perception that personality conflicts with supervisors, rather than job performance, played a major role in the determination of those who were riffed.
- 3. (Item 8) Among those who feel morale is not better, the predominant view is that the level of morale remains unchanged. This view does not, however, reflect <u>satisfaction</u> with the level of morale.
- 4. (Item 12) It was felt that the main reason for the large "below capacity" response was that ego prevented many from saying they couldn't work harder. Also, in spite of the use of the word "ability" in the previous question (Item 11), at least some responses resulted from equating capacity with ability.
- 5. (Items 17-18) Although disagreement balances agreement on question 17, the overall response appears negative when compared with the rest of the directorate. To some extent this reflects apprehension over a perceived state of confusion regarding the impact of the new system. To a greater extent the response results from a carryover of a negative view of the DDI's management of IAS. The most frequently cited reasons for this negative view are perceptions of the DDI as:
 - (a) not interested in IAS enough to find the time to visit,
 - (b) not caring enough about sound management or IAS to ensure that a fair and uniform approach to fitness report ratings be followed within the directorate, and
 - (c) not sufficiently aware or appreciative of the quality of analysis and the level of analysis that goes into our product.
- 6. (Item 38) The response was mostly seen as a vote of confidence in our supervisors as 9:9 managers.

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- 7. (Item 49) GS-14 was almost universally cited as the desired level for select "senior analysts."
- 8. (Item 61) The negative response was mostly directed towards management outside IAS. It was brought up that IAS personnel are sometimes excluded from seminars at headquarters because the level of analysis would not require our presence. This attitude (with which the MAG strongly takes issue) exists in some DDI offices and results in part from the DDI's own attitude towards our level of analysis. Also cited was a perception that collateral information sometimes arrives here later than at headquarters or not at all.
- 9. (Item 63/3) Informal, unannounced visits to the working areas by the Director would be appreciated. This would be especially pleasing to the imagery analysts when they are evaluating a new mission or working on a project of special interest.
- 10. (Items 65-76) MAG reaction to IAS scores on EEO included:
 - (a) The existence of a minor "white backlash" probably results from attitudes about conditions in other organizations (e.g. NPIC) rather than conditions in IAS.
 - (b) Some blacks did not participate in the survey, making the possible impact of black response even less than would be expected.
 - (c) Even though we are a small organization, an IAS EEO program should be formally drawn up and its results publicized.
 - (d) The DDI EEO program has little or no effect on IAS.
 - (e) Many blacks and whites are reluctant to make their attitudes concerning bias public, fearing that their careers could be hurt.
- 11. (Item 77-80) The MAG found no inconsistency in these scores. The promotion and performance evaluation system is apparently viewed as essentially fair and accurate although somewhat complicated and imperfect.
- 12. (Item 85) IAS policy on QSI's is widely perceived as a means of easing the financial plight of certain employees who have reached their terminal grade level. If this is the case, the QSI does not truly and fairly reward "quality" work. If it is

not the case, then efforts should be made to publicize the awarding of QSI's. The MAG felt that attitudes would be improved if the IAS policy governing QSI's was also made public. At present, the policy seems shrouded in rumor and mystery.

- 13. (Item 86) The response reflects our attitude towards IAS morale rather than Agency morale. Our relative isolation was not as important as the fact that our type of work was not subject to intensive public investigation or public attack.
- 14. (Item 98) The response implies that IAS is saddled with limited opportunities. We feel locked into a lower grade structure because of the nature of our work. Since there is not a very wide range of jobs available in IAS and management positions are relatively few some individuals who reach the GS-12 level feel that they have no place else to go. Adherence to stiff fitness report ratings contribute to this feeling by making personnel folders appear less "competitive" with most non-IAS folders. Methods of continuing to motivate and reward persons with this particular problem deserve attention from upper management. In addition, the IAS MAG would like to look further into problems of morale created by the "service" role of IAS.
- 15. (Item 95) There is a high level of interest in rotation outside of the Directorate because many of IAS' requesters are from DDS&T and DDO. IAS employees are interested in seeing how business is conducted in other offices, and some view rotational assignments as a possible means of obtaining a job in another organization. The prevailing negative attitude concerning management by the DDI has also figured in the makeup of this response.
 - 16. (Item 107) MAG comments are summarized:
 - (a) IAS is an "analytical shop" but does not appear to be recognized as such, particularly by the DDI.
 - (b) Reports by Headquarters analysts which contain information derived from IAS analysis seldom cite the IAS contribution.
 - (c) IAS' work is more widely used and recognized in the DDS&T than in the DDI.
 - (d) The difference between IAS and NPIC is still not apparent to some members of the DDI nor to many other members of the intelligence community.
- 17. (Item 111) The MAGID and its IAS representative maintain too low a profile. In addition, the function of the MAGID is unclear to many and the positive results of the group are perceived as

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having little effect on the work environment.

- 18. (Item 15) Difficulties regarding travel arrangements and registration for training courses were most frequently cited as factors in the negative response. All of the examples occurred in the past and do not necessarily reflect adversely upon present administrative support. Some confusion, however, exists as to where certain responsibilities for support lie. A clarification of these responsibilities should be made available to all.
- 19. (Items 120-121) The MAG saw no inconsistency here although it saw that the review process could be improved. Although needless review causes frustration, it does not necessarily lower the quality of the product.
- 20. (Item 131) In addition to the general negative opinion of management by the DDI, it was frequently stated that problem areas brought out in this survey were the same problem areas that have long been obvious. Since little was done to correct problems in the past, there was no real reason to expect positive action on them at this time.
- 21. A large majority of the MAG members found that many of the morale problems within IAS result from our status as a service organization. The elevation of that status to the level of some form of production office was considered much more beneficial to morale than, for example, a physical move of IAS to Headquarters. In the latter case, support for such a move was not found to be widespread.